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ABSTRACT
The increasing adoption of autonomous mobile robots comes with
a rising concern over the security of these systems. In this work, we
examine the dangers that an adversary could pose in a multi-agent
robot system. We show that conventional multi-agent plans are
vulnerable to strong attackers masquerading as a properly func-
tioning agent. We propose a novel technique to incorporate attack
detection into the multi-agent path-finding problem through the
simultaneous synthesis of observation plans. We show that by
specially crafting the multi-agent plan, the induced inter-agent
observations can provide introspective monitoring guarantees; we
achieve guarantees that any adversarial agent that plans to break
the system-wide security specification must necessarily violate the
induced observation plan.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in industrial production automation indicate ever-
increasing adoption of autonomous mobile robots. Systems from
Fetch Robotics and Amazon Robotics are prime examples [9, 23].
These robots, distributed across a factory floor, aid production effi-
ciency and lower human effort, but the security research community
has begun to raise alarm over the security of these systems [19].
The factory floor is at risk from malicious actors aiming towards
production shutdown [5] or causing human injury [10] through
manipulation of the robots in the environment. These threats also
extend to multi-agent systems in a less structured environment
such as unmanned aerial vehicles [13]. It is therefore important to
devise new strategies that can preemptively address these threats.
We consider a novel class of attacks called physical masquer-
ade attacks – a compromised insider (robot) masquerading as a
properly functioning robot and attempting to gain access into unau-
thorized locations without being noticed. We use the term physical
Proc. of the 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
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to distinguish this type of attack from masquerade attacks typically
considered in the network security literature [21]. In the multi-
agent path finding (MAPF) context, this manifests as one of the
agents deviating from its pre-planned path and moving into an
unauthorized zone. We show that solutions to the traditional MAPF
problem are susceptible to this type of attacks.
2 RELATEDWORK
Autonomous agents are increasingly used to manage various physi-
cal systems. This has introduced a number of vulnerabilities. Quarta
et al. explore the vulnerabilities in robotic arms of the type used
in factory assembly lines and also give a review of some notable
exploits such as in automated blast furnaces and nuclear plants [19].
The interconnection and interaction of industrial robots with
the physical world can also open up new attack surfaces. Bijani
and Robertson provide a taxonomical treatment of attacks on multi-
agent systems [4]. The common theme of these studies is that
interconnected autonomous agents suffer from lack of effective
monitoring. Our work provides introspective monitoring guaran-
tees by crafting a multi-agent plan in a way that requires an agent
to be seen by other agents at specific locations and at specific times.
There is a large body of work on multi-robot path finding [6, 15,
18, 24–27]. However, relatively scarce literature has taken security
into consideration. Among those that consider security, existing
works are primarily limited to patrol strategies for intrusion detec-
tion [1, 2, 7, 8, 14], secure communication [3, 17] and attack-resilient
network protocols [12, 20]. More recently, approaches that leverage
the physics of the environment to counter cyberattacks began to
emerge. In [11], the authors propose an algorithm that uses the
physics of wireless signals to defend against Sybil attacks in multi-
robot networks. In [22], the authors propose a Sybil attack-resilient
traffic estimation and routing algorithm that uses information from
sensing infrastructure and the dynamics and proximities of vehicles.
Our work is similar to these in spirit in the use of physical channels.
In addition, we consider novel attacker models that not only involve
insider attacks but also involve maneuvers in the physical space.
3 OBSERVATION PLANNING
We reformulate the multi-agent path finding problem to directly
incorporate security requirements. The main idea is that by sched-
uling the robots’ paths concurrently with an observation plan, the
overall system is able to detect when specific robots are not at
assigned locations at predetermined times. We call this sort of
multi-agent path finding multi-agent observation planning. A multi-
agent observation plan entails sequences of planned observations
Table 1: The left column defines solutions x to theMAPF problem [16]. The right column defines solutions y to the correspond-
ing Attack-MAPF problem.W is the world, U the set of actions, δ the update relation, Si and Gi are start and goal positions,
Ω ⊂W a set obstacles, ϕ the observation relation, and Ξ ⊆ Ω the safe locations targeted by the attacker.
MAPF(W ,U ,δ , {Si }Ri=1, {Gi }Ri=1,Ω) Attack-MAPF(W ,U ,δ ,Ω,x,ϕ,Ξ)
init. (∀ i ∈ NR ) (x1i = Si ), NR = {1, . . . ,R}
(∃ i∗ ∈ NR ) (y1 = x1i∗ ), call i∗ the attacking agent.
workspace. (∀ i ∈ NR ,t ∈ NT ) (xti ⊆W ), NT = {1, . . . ,T } (∀ t ∈ NT ) (yt ⊆W )
transition. (∀ i ∈ NR ,t ∈ NT−1 ∃u ∈ U ) (δ (xti ,u) = xt+1i ) (∀ t ∈ NT−1 ∃u ∈ U ) (δ (yt ,u) = yt+1)
collisions. (∀ i, j ∈ NR ,t ∈ NT ) (xti ∩ xtj , ∅ =⇒ i = j )
(∀ t ∈ NT , j ∈ NR \ i∗) (xti ∩ yt = ∅)
obstacles. (∀ i ∈ NR ,t ∈ NT ) (xti ∩ Ω = ∅) (∀ t ∈ NT ) (yt ∩ (Ω \ Ξ) = ∅)
goal. (∀ i ∈ NR ∃ t ∈ NT ) (Gi ∈ xti )
attack. (∃ t ∈ NT )
(
yt ∩ Ξ , ∅
)
unobserved.
(∀ t ∈ NT , j ∈ NR \ i∗) (ϕ (xtj ,xti∗ ) ⇔ ϕ (xtj ,yt ))
between robots. By carefully constructing this multi-agent obser-
vation plan, the system can detect attacks (and faults) by detecting
any difference between the planned observations and the actual
observations reported by the robots. In fact, we would like to con-
struct the multi-agent observation plan in a way that if a faulty or
attacking agent breaks the security specification then that agent
would necessarily violate the observation plan.
Given a MAPF problem instance M with solution x, we pose
the Attack-MAPF problem where an adversarial agent solves for
an alternative path that reaches a secure location undetected. The
attacker knows that all of the robots are equipped with sensors for
inter-robot communication and monitoring such as cameras and
radios. Uncompromised agents will be reporting observations to a
central controller for verification against the observation plan. The
sensor properties are known to the attacker, i.e. the attacker knows
which positions relative to uncompromised agents will result in
observations being reported to the central controller. If there exists
a solution y to this Attack-MAPF problem, then we say that x is
a vulnerable solution to M , and attack-proof otherwise. Formal
definitions of the MAPF and Attack-MAPF problems are outlined
in Table 1.
Figure 1: Solution to the MAPF problem (solid lines) for
six agents in a continuous workspace. This solution is not
attack-proof, since there is a solution to the correspond-
ing Attack-MAPF problem for the red agent (dotted line).
The compromised red agent can reach the secure location,
shown in green, after being appropriately observed by the
blue agent as in the original plan (double-headed black line)
without creating any unplanned observations.
4 RESULTS
The key metric for evaluating the danger posed by physical mas-
querade attacks is the percentage of time that conventionally ob-
tained MAPF solutions are vulnerable to the corresponding Attack-
MAPF problem.We studied a 4-connected grid environment through
an encoding to SatisfiabilityModulo Theory (SMT) and a continuous-
space/action environment through an encoding to a Mixed-Integer
Quadratically-Constrained Program. We found that overwhelm-
ingly (in excess of 90% on average) conventionally-obtained MAPF
solutions on random problem instances gave vulnerable solutions.
An Attack-MAPF solution is shown along with corresponding
MAPF solution in Figure 1. We also developed a complete and
optimal approach to computing attack-proof MAPF solutions via
an encoding to Exists Forall SMT in the 4-connected grid case. The
encoding effectively requires that no attack-MAPF solution exists
for the multi-agent plan regardless of which agent is compromised.
The details of our encodings are omitted due to space constraints.
5 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
This paper introduces a new class of attacks for multi-robot systems
where a compromised robot can masquerade as a properly func-
tioning agent and conduct clandestine maneuvers without being
detected by other agents. We indicate that solutions to purely MAPF
problems are susceptible to this type of attack. Further, we propose
a novel mechanism for detecting these physical masquerade attacks
by simultaneously synthesizing observation constraints during path
planning. In the future, we plan to study weaker attacker models
such as attackers knowing only part of the plan and the security
implication of these models. In the case where more than one agent
are compromised, collusion between these agents are possible and
new strategies (likely consensus-based) will need to developed to
detect and defend against masquerade attacks. Computationally,
MAPF problems are in general NP-hard and attack-proof MAPF
additionally requires the absence of potential attack paths in the
solutions to the MAPF problems. A subject of current investiga-
tion is the exact complexity characterization of attack MAPF and
attack-proof MAPF. In addition, since the EFSMT-based approach
is effectively centralized planning and these types of approaches
often face scalability issues, we plan to investigate decoupled and/or
decentralized approaches to compute attack-proof MAPF solutions.
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